Analysing the roll call votes of the MPs of the Weimar republic we find that 1) party competition in the Weimar parliaments can be structured on two dimensions: a left-right and a pro-/anti-democratic dimension. Remarkably, this is stable throughout the entire lifespan of the Republic and not only in the later years and despite the varying content of the votes across the lifespan of the Republic 2) that the nearly all parties were troubled by intra-party divisions, though especially the national socialists and the communists became homogenous in the last years of the Republic.
Introduction
The interest in the Weimar republic has been large by both scholars in economics (e.g. Myerson 2004; van Riel & Schram 1993) , history (e.g. Jones 1972 Jones , 2009 Schönhoven 2002 ) and political science (e.g. Berg-Schlosser 1995; Berman 1997; Lehmann 2009; Lieberman 1998; Loewenberg 1971) . The studies have covered a wide range of topics from the elections, the political culture, and the rise of national socialism to the various reasons that lead to the demise of the republic. One part of the Weimar republic is however, less studied: the parliament of the Weimar republic -the Reichstag.
Specifically, how the elected representatives voted and how the voting patterns can help identify shifts in policies and intra-party conflict.
In this paper we ask to how the party competition in the parliament was structured and how the main parties of the Weimar republic dealt with this, especially in terms of intra-party politics. In order to answer this question we analyze roll call votes cast during the Weimar parliaments by using ideal point estimation. From this analysis we are not only able to see where the parties were positioned in relation to one another, but also to address the various fluctuations among the parties, to analyze which dimensions were relevant for the party competition during the Weimar years and to discuss the dynamics of intra-party politics among the major parties of the era.
Our results show several interesting factors. First, two dimensions were in play in parliament. This is an ideological left-right dimension and, more importantly, a pro vs. anti-Weimar republic dimension. We argue that this second dimension was salient for too many parties for the republic to be viable in the long run. The fall of the republic was influenced by the anti-republican forces of both left and right, whereas the importance and influence of the pro-republican parties dropped markedly over the few years the republic existed. This is corroborated by Jones (1972) who argues that the bourgeois politics fragmented over the years of the Weimar Republic. Secondly, we find that this was not limited to the later years of the Republic, as argued by Loewenberg (1971) , but can be found throughout the entire short lifetime of the Republic. Thirdly, we find that the two-dimensional solution was stable despite large variation in the content of votes, making the Weimar Republic different to other democracies collapsing at the same period. Finally, we argue that intra-party conflict was evident for many parties on both dimensions.
The Weimar republic and its parties
From its creation the Weimar republic was haunted by a large degree of instability which in the end helped its demise. This instability was based on several factors. One of them being the fragmentation of the parliament in several smaller parties which comes natural from a proportional electoral system (Duverger 1954) . However, this was not the only reason as a fragmented parliament was also found in other countries in the period between WW1 and WW2, for example the Netherlands (Berg-Schlosser 1995) . What was even more important was the fact that the parties on the right, National Conservatives (DNVP) and National Socialists (NSDAP), and on the left, Independent Social Democrats (USPD) and Communists (KPD), belonged to the group of the largest parties between 1920 and 1932. These parties did not accept the 1919 constitution and wanted it replaced with a different system. The remaining parties -Social Democrats (SPD), the Catholic 'Zentrum' (Centre Party) and the left-liberal Democratic Party (DDP) -had been the guardians of the parliamentary democracy which was in place from 1919-1933. 1 The vast differences was also seen by the fact the Republic had a vast number of changing governments during its brief existence.
External factors also had a great deal of influence on the instability. From the outset the Republic was dealt a poor hand, as the shifting coalitions had to deal with the problems stemming from the First World War and especially the peace negotiations (Kolb 2002:1-10; Schönhoven 2002) . While the Social Democrats, the Centre Party and DDP all favored and supported the negotiated peace, they were faced with the task of implementing the dictates of the Allied victors. In the Versailles treaty Germany was not only asked to pay a substantial financial amount as penalty for the war, but also to reduce its military forces substantially and of course also deal with the loss of parts of what used to be German territory. Also the often occurring coup attempts by right wing forces as well as the inflation and the occupation of the Ruhr-area by French and Belgian troops had a destabilizing influence on the Weimar republic.
The party system of the Weimar Republic
1 Note that since 1930 the president of the Weimar Republic installed the government by ignoring the preferences of the parliamentary groups in the Reichstag.
In German society there are historically two distinct societal cleavages in play; one between the state and the Catholic Church and one between worker and capital (Lipset & Rokkan 1967) . The former came to prominence in the cultural battle of the 1870es and 1880es in the early days of the German State, and it resulted in the formation of the Centre Party to represent the interests of Roman-Catholics in Germany. The latter was the conflict between employer and employee which saw especially the development of the Social Democratic party and later the Communist Party. A general overview of the major parties of the Weimar republic on that we restrict our analysis can be found in table 1.
Following socio-historical approaches on the German society and the party system in the late 19 th and the early 20 th century, four to five social groups or so-called 'milieus' can be identified that have a special relationship towards the major parties (Peukert 1987: 149-161; Lepsius 1993) . These milieus and thus the parties belonging to them can be divided into two categories; the individually oriented milieu and the organizational milieu (Pyta 1997: 208-213 We refer to the data used in this article to calculate the cohesion of parliamentary parties in the Weimar Republic. The data is described in the subsequent sections of this paper in more detail. For a more indepth analysis of the cohesion of all party groups represented in the Reichstag see Markmann (1955) .
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Analyzing the Dimensionality of Parliaments
The question of the dimensionality of a political system is far from trivial.
Unidimensionality is theorized to be stable and multidimensionality to be chaotic (McLean 2006: 153-154 ). Theoretically, it is possible that a large number of dimensions exist in any political space. Empirically, it is another story. The fact is that unidimensionality is dominant in most of the studies of comparative politics. The concept of left-right has dominated politics since before the French revolution and its importance has become even larger ever since the dominance of spatial analysis in comparative politics starting with Downs (1957) . Nagel (2006) presents two theoretical considerations why unidimensionality is so predominant; it is either due to the fact that with the left-right we can explain a large part of the variation and hence, the need for more dimensions does not exist. Or it could be due to a normative wish of achieving majority rule, which unidimensionality helps as the median voter will be the Condorcet winner. Robertson (2006) follows some of the same argumentation and concludes that politics is unidimensional and that the only dimension may well be called left and right.
The last decades have seen a dramatic increase in work determining the dimensionality of political space and estimating the positions of the political actors in such a space using some form of roll call votes as data. While these studies on the one hand show strong first dimensions there are empirical examples from around the world that legislatures can be multidimensional. It was the introduction of the NOMINATE approach (Poole & Rosenthal 1997) which was the influential factor in the vast quantity of studies of the roll call votes of the U.S. Congress. It was followed by works such as
Voeten (2000) Comparative research in the dimensionality of parliaments has shown that it is often a government-opposition dimension and not a left-right conflict which is the primary dimension (Hix & Noury 2008) . This is due to the specific institutional features of parliamentary systems where it is the norm that the government controls the agenda and the opposition react to the proposal put forward by the government making it a question of whether you are with or against the government that the determines how you vote as an MP. The left-right dimension does however, come out as a second dimension in most of the studied parliaments (Hix & Noury 2008) . Even in non-parliamentary system like the US two dimensions do occur, albeit infrequently. Poole & Rosenthal (1997) have shown that the US Congress is heavily dominated by one dimension; a liberal-conservative, though in some periods also a second dimension which can be labeled progressive-conservative, which from around 1945-1960 was a question of civil rights. For the European Parliament it has been shown that the primary dimension is left-right but a second dimension on EU-integration can also be found, which given the particularities of the European Parliament perhaps is not surprising (Hix 2002; Hix, Noury & Roland 2006) .
As the Weimar republic was a parliamentary system we would expect to find two dimensions; a government-opposition dimension as the first and a left-right dimension as the second. If this is the finding then the Weimar parliaments were "normal" parliaments compared to other across time. However, if this is not the case there is another expectation that we can have; due to the specific features of the parties competing during the Weimar years we know that two distinct groups exist; the prorepublic parties and the anti-republic parties. Hence, in case a government-opposition dimension and a left-right can not be found we might expect that what occurs instead is a pro-/anti-republic dimension.
Operationalisation and data
In the Weimar parliaments a roll call vote could be called following §105 of the Standing Order of the parliament when at least 50 attending members requested this (Markmann 1955: 22) . Because the number of MPs increased from 459 in the first legislative period, which lasted from 1920-1924, up Table 2 combined with the often changing governments there is an overall problem for estimating the ideal points and hence determining the dimensionality. It would be preferable if the government composition was constant in the period for which the ideal points are estimated. However, this is not feasible as we will then end up with more periods with few votes, instead of as it now stands four periods were it is feasible to estimate the ideal points. We estimate the ideal points for the four periods separately, which in turn means that it is possible to determine and discuss the dimensionality of each period. Another reason for estimating the ideal points separately and not in a pooled version is the variation in the content of the votes. In Table 3 von Hindenburg (Schönhoven 1972) . Lieberman (1998) argues that it is the parties which we find to be at the upper end on the vertical axis which during the Weimar Republic consistently advocated anti-system ideologies. Turning to the intra-party differences among the MPs we learn that most parties have outliers on both dimensions.
However, the Centre Party is, while more coherent on the socio-economic dimension much less so when it comes to the pro/anti-republic dimension, though the members are still mostly supportive of the republic. On the other hand, the conservative DNVP experience most of the variation on the socio-economic dimension while they are more cohesive when it comes to having a skeptical view towards the republic.
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The existence of the second dimension of pro-/anti-republic sentiments can also be they split, and follows the positions of the DVP and the renamed DDP. This informs us that the split which happened in the German Nationalists made it easier for the radical wing of the party to change to a much more skeptical position towards the Weimar republic than was the case before the split (Mergel 2003 (Mergel , 2005 . In this period there are still outliers present, though to a lesser degree than previously. The Communists, Social
Democrats and National Socialists are all very cohesive in their voting patterns. The conservative DNVP is also extremely cohesive, albeit more clearly on the pro-/antirepublican dimension than on the socio-economic dimension. The Centre Party is now more stretched out on the socio-economic dimension than previously and somewhat more cohesive on the pro-/anti-republican dimension.
The overall patterns in the voting behavior that we have seen in the parliaments of the Weimar republic have two major implications. First of all, for nearly all parties at one point in time there are large discrepancies in how the MPs vote. This in turn mean that the voting patterns that we find can be used to interpret and understand the intraparty politics of the parties of the Weimar republic in a quantitative fashion, something hitherto unknown. By presenting the voting patterns, the second part of the story is that we can understand the rise and importance of both right-wing and left-wing parties and the homogenous nature in which they voted at least in the later part of the Weimar republic.
Discussion
The results of the roll call vote analysis of MPs represented in the Weimar Reichstag have shown that in comparison to 'modern' parliamentary democracies the Reichstag of the Weimar republic was not structured by a government-opposition divide, but rather by two conflicts: while the first one reflected ideology and thus the left-right ordering of the parties, the second dimension shows the preferences of MPs with regard to the order of the political system. This is despite the (often used) possibility to vote the Chancellor or any minister out of office without offering a successor on the basis of a vote of confidence, which was provided by § 54 of the constitution of the Weimar Republic. In particular Communists and National Socialists made successfully use of this opportunity provided by the constitution to destabilize the political system even more.
Whereas the (economically determined) left-right conflict is observable at least as the second dimension in a number of parliaments according to Hix and Noury (2008) , the conspicuous absence of the government-opposition dimension from the twodimensional model can be seen as a sign that the parliaments of the Weimar Republic was anything but a normal parliament, especially when we compare with other parliaments of the 20 th and 21 st century. What is further interesting is the stability of the dimensions. From the outset a left-right dimension can be observed as the first dimension and the pro-/anti-Republic dimension as a second. This is a remarkable finding when taking the distribution of the content of the votes into account (see table   3 ). The variation in the policy areas the votes belong to could lead to vast differences in the estimated positions, which is far from being the case. The two-dimensional models explain at it least successful instance 97 per cent which informs us that the addition of a third dimension will provide relatively little information. The gain in information comes from moving from a unidimensional model to a two-dimensional model, where the increase in the percentage of correctly classified votes is higher than for instance for the U.S. Congress (see Poole & Rosenthal 1997:28) .
The extraction of a dimension that deals with the support and rejection of the current political system shows how disputed and polarized the political order as a whole 
